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This paper examines the performance of minimum wage legislation in Kenya, both in 
terms of its coverage and enforcement as well as in terms of their associations with wages 
and employment. Our findings based on the 1998/99 labor force data—the last labor 
force survey available-- indicate that minimum wages were better enforced and had 
stronger effects in the urban areas than in the agriculture industry. More specifically, our 
results suggest that (i) compliance rates were higher in urban areas, (ii) minimum wages 
are positively associated with wages of unskilled workers and women in urban areas, 
while no such relationship is found for workers in agriculture, and (iii) higher minimum 
wages were associated with a lower share of workers in formal activities in a given 
occupation and location. Our estimates indicate that a 10 percent point increase in the 
minimum to median wage ratio could be associated with a decline in the share of formal 
employment of between 1.2-5.6 percentage points –and an increase of between 2.7-5.9 







                                                 
1 This paper has been prepared as background work for the World Bank study “Jobs in Kenya”. The authors 
are deeply indebted to Sara Lemos, Sumana Dhar and the Government of Kenya for very valuable 
comments and discussions. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Policies to set “living wages” are a popular but contentious instrument. As Blanchard 
(2002) suggests, the main reason for instituting minimum wages is to empower workers 
whose wages are constrained by the excessive market power of employers. To the extent 
that minimum wages are enforced they can bring sizeable income gains to a number of 
workers leading to reductions in poverty and inequality at relatively small costs in terms 
of employment. However, much of the existing evidence for developing countries 
indicates that minimum wages bring undesirable side effects, displacing workers from 
formal sector jobs. The effectiveness of this instrument in lower income countries has 
also been questioned on the grounds that it tends to cover a small minority of relatively 
well-off workers in the formal sector, leaving the vast majority of informal workers 
behind.  At the same time however, the evidence is far from conclusive. The fact that 
different effects are found across different countries underscores the importance of 
country-specific factors --such as the level at which minimum wages are set or the 
structure of the labor market-- to determine its effects.  
 
As many other countries, Kenya has held an active minimum wage setting policy since 
independence. There are as many as seventeen minimum wage orders, setting a large 
number of minimum wage floors that vary by occupation, sector of activity and location. 
Many of such minimum wages are updated annually.  
 
Evidence of the effect of minimum wages in African countries, including Kenya, is 
hampered by the scarcity of data. In a descriptive paper, Omolo and Omitti (2004) find 
that the minimum wage policy in Kenya has failed to contribute to sustained poverty 
reduction. Moreover, using aggregate time series data they find a negative correlation 
between minimum wages and modern private sector employment.  This paper contributes 
to the literature of the effects of minimum wages on the Kenyan labor market by: (i) 
examining the performance of the legislation of minimum wages in Kenya, both in terms 
of its coverage and enforcement, and (ii) estimating the effects on wages and employment 
using micro data. Our findings based on the 1998/99 labor force data indicate that 
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minimum wages were better enforced and had stronger effects in the urban areas than in 
agriculture industry. More specifically, our results suggest that (i) compliance rates were 
higher in urban areas, (ii) minimum wages raised wages for unskilled workers and 
women in urban areas, while no such effects were found for workers in agriculture, and 
(iii) higher minimum wages were associated with a lower share of workers in formal 
activities, and a higher share of workers in self-employment in a given occupation and 
location.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two lays down the arguments and 
empirical evidence for and against minimum wage setting.  Section three describes the 
institutions for minimum wage setting in Kenya.  Section four presents the data used in 
this study. Section five examines the enforcement and wage effects of minimum wages. 
Section six reports some estimates of its effects on the structure of employment and 
section seven concludes.   
 
II. Arguments For and Against Minimum Wages 
 
The main justification for instituting minimum wages is to empower workers whose 
wages are constrained by the excessive market power of employers (Blanchard, 2002). 
This situation is likely to emerge in markets where there are very few employers or 
workers do not have the information or the income to search for better paying jobs.  The 
most extreme cases are mining enclaves or one-company towns, where workers have the 
choice of accepting a very low wage or not working at all. Lack of job registries and 
unemployment insurance also reduce the bargaining power of workers by limiting their 
capacity to search for alternative jobs. 
 
Another two arguments proposed in favor of minimum wage setting relate to efficiency-
wage arguments and the fact that minimum wages increase workers’ purchasing power, 
which in turn can stimulate labor demand (Levin-Waldman, 1997). The efficiency-wage 
argument states that higher wages can increase workers’ productivity, which in turn 
allows employers to pay higher wages. One reason for an increase in productivity might 
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be that higher wages allow workers to improve their nutrition and their human 
development.  Another version of this argument is that minimum wages force managers 
to provide on-the-job training, which makes workers more productive. Yet, it may be also 
argued that in the absence of well developed incentives to provide training, firms may 
just become more selective, hiring workers with higher productivity rather than incurring 
in the cost of training them. On its part, the purchasing power argument requires that low 
wage business benefit from the higher consumption of low-income workers, which may 
not necessarily be the case. In absence of that link the effects are likely to be small, as 
increased sales are not likely to compensate for higher wage costs.   
 
A central rationale for minimum wage legislation is that it helps lift the working poor out 
of poverty by raising their wages. Fields and Kanbur (2007) develop a model that allows 
for income-sharing between employed and unemployed persons in society and within 
families. Their results indicate that poverty can actually decrease, increase or remain 
unchanged depending on the degree of poverty aversion, the elasticity of labor demand, 
the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line, and the extent of income sharing.  
 
Yet, despite its potential gains, there are also important reasons to be cautious in the use 
of minimum wages as a policy instrument. The standard competitive model predicts that 
forcing the price of labor above the price attained in the market leads to job losses in 
firms where regulations are enforced, and an increase in employment in the uncovered 
sector. This model relies on the assumption that workers are paid their marginal value 
and therefore, any attempts to raise wages above that value, price workers out of jobs. 
The ultimate effect of minimum wage depends on whether the statutory minim is set 
above the marginal value of labor, which ultimately is an empirical question.  
 
Most of the empirical literature focuses on the effect of minimum wages on poverty, 
inequality and employment. A number of studies have documented that minimum wage 
policies can reduce wage inequality and poverty in developing countries. For example, 
Lemos (2004) finds a strong effect of the minimum wage in compressing the wage 
distribution in Brazil, despite a large share of informal employment. For Latin America, 
 5
Morley (1995) finds that poverty falls as the minimum wage rises. Lustig and Mcleod 
(1997) use time series data for a number of developing countries to study the effects of 
minimum wages on poverty and confirm that increases in the minimum wages are 
associated with declines in short-term poverty.  In fact, Maloney and Nuñez (2004) 
document that in some countries minimum wages can be an important reference wage in 
the informal sector, thus contributing to alter the distribution of wages also in that sector.  
 
The evidence on the effects on employment is quite mixed. A number of studies in 
developed countries have failed to find significant negative impacts.2 However other 
studies find sizeable negative effects3. In contrast, most of the evidence for developing 
countries points to negative employment effects, in particular when wages are set at 
relatively high levels in relation to the median wage.   Bell (1997) uses firm level data for 
Mexico and Colombia and finds that in the latter a 10% increase in minimum wages leads 
to a decline in low-wage employment of 2-12% (depending on the specification). Instead, 
she finds no effects in Mexico where the minimum wage is set at a lower level relative to 
the median wage. Maloney and Nuñez, (2004) also identify negative effects in Colombia. 
Cowan et al. (2004) and Montenegro and Pagés (2004) find negative effects of an 
increase in minimum wages in Chile. Gindling and Terrel (2005) analyze the effect of 
multiple minimum wages –much like in Kenya—on employment in Costa Rica. They 
find that a 10 percent increase reduces formal employment by 1 %.  Rama (2001) studies 
the effect of the minimum wage in Indonesia and finds and effect of similar magnitude 
(2%). In contrast, Lemos (2004) finds little evidence of adverse employment effects in 
Brazil.  
 
Evidence for Africa is hampered by the scarcity of data. Nonetheless, the existing studies 
also suggest negative effects on employment.  Jones (1997) finds that a 10 percent 
increase in minimum wages in Ghana leads to a decline in manufacturing employment of 
                                                 
2 Card and Krueger (1994) found no evidence that a raise in the minimum wage lead to a decline in firm-
level employment in a low wage sector (fast-food) in the United States. Dickens, Machine and Manning 
(1999) studied the effect of Minimum Wages in Britain using longitudinal data on workers and also found 
little impact on employment.   




between 5-6% and an increase in employment in the informal sector.  However, some of 
her estimates point to smaller effects.  Bhorat (2000) finds that mandatory wage increases 
in South Africa would result in significant job losses in low pay occupations, such as 
low-paid domestic workers and farm workers. Finally, Omolo and Omitti (2004) find 
similar negative effects in Kenya. All in all, the available evidence points to negative and 
in some cases sizeable effects of minimum wages on employment.  
 
III. Institutions for Minimum Wage Setting  
 
Minimum wages in Kenya are specified as part of a national wage policy set in place 
before independence and guided by the Regulation of Wages and Conditions of 
Employment Act (CAP 229).  The objective of such policy has been to reduce poverty as 
well as to protect and promote the living standards of workers (Omolo and Omitti, 2004)    
 Two wage boards: The Agricultural Wages Advisory Board (AWAB) and the General 
Wages Advisory Board (GWAB) give recommendations on the wages that might be 
published each year on May 1 and the employment conditions of workers. The GWAB 
has the authority to appoint Wage Councils to set statutory working conditions and 
minimum wages in different occupations. There are 17 such wage councils, but most of 
them have only updated statutory wages on an ad-hoc basis and so they are often 
outdated. The AWAB and the GWAB set statutory minimum wage orders for agricultural 
workers and for workers who are not covered by specific-wage boards, respectively.  The 
boards have a tripartite structure (dominated by the Ministry of Labor, the central 
organization of trade unions and the Federation of Kenyan Employers) and are chaired by 
an independent member (usually a labor market or industry expert). Given the advisory 
status of the boards, the Ministry of Labor can modify their proposals without 
consultation.  Since 2002, the government has not specified the statutory minimum wages 
for labor below 18 years of age in order to discourage the employment of children.  
 
Within agriculture or the general order, statutory minimum wages vary by age and 
occupation. In addition, for the general order, minimum wages also vary by location, 
distinguishing three separate urban areas with different minimum wage levels. These 
geographical areas are: Nairobi and Mombassa, other municipalities, and other towns. 
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The classification of occupations retains the colonial job classification in Kenya,   --with 
a few additions and no subtractions over time-- implying that some wage categories may 
be irrelevant for the current job market. Tables 1 and 2 list the schedule of minimum 
wages specified by the agricultural and general order, respectively, for the years 1997-
2004.  Within occupation and locations, minimum wages increase with the skill level and 
with city size.  Despite the many values of the minimum wages, relative minimum wages 
have been kept constant by virtue of multiplying all minimum wages by the same growth 
factor.4 Therefore, different minimum wages across occupations have not contributed to 
modify relative wages across occupations or locations. 
 
In real terms, minimum wages fell sharply from the period 1991 to 1994 and then 
increased afterwards at a rate of 2 percent a year. However, in 2004 real wages had not 
recovered the 1991 level (Figure 1). In the last years (since 1998) real minimum wages 
have grown in line with real GDP per capita, but much below the growth rate of real 
wages in the private sector (Figure 1). The evolution of the real minimum wage is almost 
identical if rather than a price index for the lower income group, available only for 
Nairobi, an overall CPI index, obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) is 
used.  
 
The stabilization of inflation in 1995 brought real gains in minimum and average wages. 
However, the relaxation of wage guidelines in mid 1994 was followed by an upward 
adjustment of real wages in both the public and the private sector (Kulundu Manda, 
2002), which was not accompanied by similar adjustments in the minimum wage.  In 
fact, compared to the average wage, minimum wages for general laborers declined from 
0.35 of the average wage in the private sector in 1994, to 0.17 in 2004 (Figure 2). Given 
this evolution it is quite unlikely that minimum wages are behind the sharp increase in 





                                                 
4 That is, with very few exceptions, the ratio of any minimum wage to the average minimum wage has been 
constant over the last years.  
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III. Data  
 
In this study, we rely on aggregate data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (Economic 
Survey, various years) and micro-data from the 1998/99 Integrated Labour Force Survey 
(ILFS), a nationally representative survey conducted during the months of December 
1998 and January 1999 to 11,040 households. At the individual level there are records for 
52016 individuals. The main purpose of this survey was to gather information on the 
labor force, the informal sector and child labor in Kenya.  
 
In the analysis that follows the term “salaried” or “paid employees” refers to all workers 
working for someone else, in exchange for a wage or a salary. Salary is defined as 
income from paid employment before adding other benefits and allowances, and before 
deducting taxes and other compulsory deduction. The self-employed category is 
comprised of working employers and own account workers, that is, people that operate 
their own businesses. Working employers hire one or more employees and own account 
workers hire no employees. Unskilled workers in agricultural activities and general 
laborers under the regulations of the GWAB are those who work in elementary 
occupations according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-
88). 
 
The informal sector, also referred to as "Jua Kali", covers all small-scale activities that 
are normally semi-organised and unregulated, and use low and simple technology. The 
formal sector includes the modern sector (private and public) as well as small-scale 
agriculture and pastoralist activities. Finally, we classify as low educated workers those 
whose highest education attainment is incomplete secondaryor less while educated 
workers are those who have completed secondaryschooling or more. 
 
Panels I and II of Table 3 report summary statistics for the entire population and for those 
who work. For the latter, we restrict the sample to those between 18 and 65 years old.5 
                                                 
5  We excluded workers below 18 years because, for this age group, the official publications on minimum 
wages of the CBS reproduced in Tables 1 and 2 of this document solely report minimum wages for 
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Data indicates a high share of children (42 percent) and of low educated people (8 
percent with primary education or less), and a majority of the people living in rural areas 
(74 percent) Out of those who live in urban areas 35.7 percent are concentrated in the 
largest cities: Nairobi and Mombassa.  
 
Regarding those in work, one in four workers were self-employed, 33.6 percent were paid 
employees and a large majority of employed workers were in unpaid work (43 percent). 
Out of those in salaried jobs, one quarter were in the informal sector, 55 percent lived in 
urban areas, 14 percent were engaged in agricultural activities and 30 percent were public 
sector employees.  
 
Panel III of Table 3 presents wage indicators for salaried workers aged 18-64 who earned 
positive wages in the month of reference and worked full time. Restricting the sample 
this way yields 3,331 observations. Not surprisingly, earnings were lower in the informal 
compared to those in the formal sector. In addition, wage inequality was higher in the 
informal sector.  
 
IV. Incidence and Compliance of Minimum Wages 
 
Minimum wages in Kenya are said to suffer from inadequate enforcement. Omolo and 
Omitti (2004) indicate that “[even] the government itself does not adhere to the minimum 
wage regulations” (p.16).  Using microdata from the 1998/99 Integrated Labor Force 
Survey (ILFS)—the last cross section of household data available— it is possible to 
estimate the degree of coverage and enforcement of the minimum wage in that year. 
These calculations are performed separately for general order (urban areas) and 
agricultural  minimum wages.  
 
We determine the specific minimumwage that applies to each worker based on the 
reported sector of activity, geographical location and the occupation according to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
unskilled, stockman, herdsman and watchman in agricultural activities. Moreover, since 2002, the 
government no longer specifies the statutory minimum wages for labor below 18 years of age in order to 
discourage child employment.  
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Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act and the (ISCO-88). It is quite 
difficult to match the list of occupations listed in the Minimum wage schedule with 
theISCO-88 classification of occupations. For example, the minimum wage schedule lists 
at least four different minimum wages for clerical jobs. Thus, it distinguishes between 
junior clerks, typists, cashiers and general clerks. Given these difficulties, we follow the 
following methodology to match workers to minimum wage categories:  For all workers 
for whom there is no clear match to the MW categories we assign them to the general 
laborer minimum wage. This is the wage that according to the minimum wage regulation 
applies to all workers except when other orders specify a higher minimum wage.  For 
workers for which a match between the ISCO occupation and the MW schedule is done 
and the MW schedule specifies a higher minimum wage than the wages for general 
laborers, we replace the general minimum wage with the higher minimum wage specified 
under the law. Finally, when the MW distinguishes different levels of MW for workers 
within the same occupation group, we assign the lower minimum wage within category. 
For example in the case of clerks, this implies that all non-clearly assigned workers in 
clerical jobs are given the “junior clerk” minimum wage level.  
 
There are several additional sample restrictions. 1,661 of the 3,331 workers who earned 
positive wages in the month of reference and worked full time were engaged in non-
agricultural activities in rural zones. The laws of minimum wages suggest the GWAB 
should fix minimum wages for workers in rural areas engaged in non-agricultural 
activities. However, we were unable to find the schedule of minimum wages that apply to 
these workers in the official publications of the CBS so we had to drop these people from 
the analysis. The self-employed are not included in these calculations since they are not 
covered by minimum wage laws. In addition, earnings data for self-employed workers is 
not available. Unpaid family workers are also excluded. Additional restrictions due to 
missing data on status of employment reduce the sample to 1772 observations. Non-
compliance rates (reported below) would be much higher if this large group was included 
in the calculations.   
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We find substantial non-compliance rates. About 24 percent of the salaried workers in 
agriculture and 17 percent of salaried workers in non-agricultural activities in urban areas 
earned monthly wages below the statutory minimum (see Table 4, column identified as 
Fraction below). Non-compliance was particularly high among workers in the higher 
skill occupations in urban zones such as dyers, crawlers, tractor drivers, salesmen, saw 
doctor or caretakers where it reached 67 percent. Among the different types of workers, 
non-compliance was similar for men and women in agriculture, but much higher for 
women (25%), relative to men (7%), in the general order (Table 5). Non-compliance was 
also higher for less educated workers, particularly in agriculture and for young workers 
(18-25 years old) both in agricultural and in general order (Tables 6 and 7).  Within the 
general order regime, non-compliance was higher in municipalities other than Nairobi 
and Mombassa (Table 8).  
 
The ILFS data allows identifying the percentage of workers whose earnings are at the 
minimum wage level. This percentage is usually identified with the term “Fraction”.  
Only a small fraction of salaried workers received monthly wages equal to the statutory 
minimum. If fraction is measured as all workers whose earnings are within a range of 
plus/minus two percent of the statutory minimum wage, it is found that only 0.3 percent 
of the workers in agricultural activities, and 2.1 percent of workers in urban areas had 
earnings within that range (see Table 4, column identified as fraction at +/-2  %) Even 
when this interval is increased to plus/minus 5 percent of the minimum wage, the share of 
workers whose earnings fall in that range is not very large: 6.8 percent for agricultural 
and 2.9 for urban workers. The fraction at the minimum wage is higher for men, less 
educated and young workers.  
 
The number of workers whose wage and employment status are potentially influenced by 
the minimum wage increases somewhat if we adopt as a measure of the importance of the 
minimum wage the fraction affected, that is the proportion of workers whose wages are 
just above the 1998 minimum wage, but below the wage set the following year in May 
1st, 1999.6 These workers could have potentially lost their jobs after the following update 
                                                 
6 When reporting fraction affected, wages are expressed in constant prices of October 1997. 
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if the wage in 1998/99 reflected their productivity. According to this measure, 8.1 percent 
of the workers in agriculture and 5.1 in general order were at risk of being affected by the 
minimum wage increase. This percentage is higher for women, less educated and younger 
workers. 
 
The ratio of the minimum to the average wage is a widely used measure to assess the 
toughness of the minimum wage. This measure is often called the Kaitz ratio.  Another 
often reported measure is the ratio of the minimum wage relative to the median wage in 
the economy. Measures referred to the median wage are more appropriated in countries 
with high earnings inequality or in instances where the minimum wage could be affecting 
the average wage.  Based on this latter indicator, minimum wages in Kenya are 0.39 and 
0.76 of the median wage for agricultural and general order, respectively (see last column 
in Tables 4-8) By way of comparison Maloney and Nuñez (2004) find this indicator to be 
0.68 in Colombia, a country in which minimum wages are considered to be high and 
binding. This ratio is lower for the unskilled occupations in both the agricultural and 
general order. However, a number of minimum wages for semiskilled or skilled 
occupations are set at levels that are very high relative to the median wages (above 2/3 of 
the median). 
 
Based on the 1998/9 levels—there were 18 minimum wages that were higher than 70 
percent of the median in urban areas (Table 9).  By way of comparison, Levin-Waldman, 
1997 suggests setting minimum wages at the median of the unskilled labor wages.  In 
Kenya, most minimum wages in urban areas are way above that range. And while 
minimum wages in rural areas look low, they are still above this threshold when 
compared to the wages of unskilled labor for agricultural areas (Table 9). 
 
V. Incidence of the Minimum Wage on Wage level and Distribution 
 
 
The analysis of the coverage, level and incidence of the minimum wage yields a mixed 
picture. While wages are set at quite high levels relative to the median wage, non-
compliance is high and the fraction of workers that receive wages at the minimum is 
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relatively small. The latter suggest that minimum wages may not be affecting the level or 
the distribution of wages in a noticeable way.   
 
The Labor Force data (1998/1999) indicates that across occupations there is a strong 
positive relation between the level and the percentage of non-compliance of the minimum 
wage, as shown in Figure 3. The former suggests that in Kenya, attempts to raise the 
minimum wage to significant levels in relation to the median wage lead to increasing 
non-compliance, thus reducing the scope for effects of the minimum wage on wages.   
 
A common way to judge whether minimum wages have an influence in the overall wage 
distribution is to assess the shape of the distribution and see whether a large number of 
workers are bunched around the minimum wage level. If minimum wages do not exert 
any influence, the distribution of the logarithm of wages will display a typical Normal 
curve. If instead, the minimum wage is exerting a significant influence, many workers 
will receive wages at the minimum level and the wage distribution will show a spike at 
the minimum wage. In addition, there will be few workers with earnings immediately 
below the statutory minimum, as their wages will have been pushed up by the effect of 
establishing a wage floor. To accommodate the fact that Kenya has a large number of 
minimum wages, we present two curves in the same graph. The first presents the 
distribution of minimum wages; the second is a histogram of the wage distribution.  
Spikes in the distribution of minimum wages indicate minimum wage levels that, at least 
in principle, are applicable to many workers.  These are the levels of the minimum wage 
that are likely to exert a higher influence in the distribution of wages, and the ones on 
which we focus our attention.  
 
 
Figures 4 and 5 present the distribution of wages and minimum wages in the agricultural 
sector for formal and informal salaried workers, respectively. We focus first on the 
distribution of minimum wages. The solid line in the figure indicates how many workers 
are subjected to each level of minimum wages. The spikes in this curve indicate that in 
agriculture, two minimum wage levels apply, at least in principle, to a large number of 
workers.  These are the statutory wages for unskilled workers and for stockman, 
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herdsman and watchman. In comparison, minimum wages for other occupations are 
applicable only to a small number of salaried agricultural workers. We then assess 
whether the distribution of wages displays spikes at any of the two minimum wage levels 
mentioned above, either in the formal or informal wage distribution. This would indicate 
that statutory minimum wages alter the wage distribution.  An examination of Figures 4 
and 5 shows that there are no spikes in the wage distribution at the two mentioned 
minimum wage levels in the formal or in the informal sector, even though compliance 
levels are higher in the formal sector 
 
In contrast, general order minimum wages do appear to affect the distribution of wages in 
urban areas.  An inspection to Figure 6 suggests a large spike at the second lowest 
general order minimum wage (general laborers in municipalities other than Nairobi and 
Mombassa), which is not evident in the figure for informal employment (Figure 7).  
Figure 6 also reveals substantial compliance with the minimum wage. The distribution of 
wages for formal workers lies mostly at the right of the minimum wage for general 
laborers. Instead, non-compliance is high and minimum wages appear not to affect the 
distribution of wages in the informal sector (Figure 7).  
 
The former finding suggests that minimum wages might be pushing up the level of wages 
for formal workers in urban areas—particularly in municipalities other than Nairobi and 
Mombassa.  
 
While a visual inspection is useful to determine whether minimum wages might be 
altering the shape of the wage distribution, it does not provide conclusive evidence about 
the relationship of minimum wages and earnings controlling for individual characteristics 
and other factors that influence the wage level.  We do so, by estimating the following 
specification separately for agricultural and general order: 
 
iojsjoiojioj XMWW ετττβα ++++Γ++= lnln                      )1(  
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where iojW is monthly real wage of worker i in occupation o and location j; ojMW  is the 
monthly real minimum wage for occupation o and location j; iX  is a vector of personal 
characteristics (level of education, gender and age); oτ , jτ and sτ  are sets of indicator 
variables for occupation, location and sector of employment (formal or informal), 
respectively and iojε  is the error term. In some specifications we also include interactions 
of the minimum wages with personal characteristics and the sector of employment.  
 
The first and the fourth columns in Table 9 report the simple correlation between the 
level of wages and minimum wages, for agricultural and general order minimum wages. 
Such correlation is found to be positive and statistically significant for agricultural 
activities. A positive association however does not provide conclusive evidence that 
higher minimum wages are causing higher wages, since the reverse causality is also 
likely to be in effect: occupations with higher wages have associated higher minimum 
wages. To correct for this issue, columns (2) and (4) in Table 9 examine the correlation 
between wages and minimum wages controlling for a number of individual and job 
characteristics that explain the level of wages across occupations. Once these effects are 
taken into account, the minimum wage is no longer significant in explaining the level of 
wages for the average worker. 
 
Yet, minimum wages may be relevant for explaining the wage level of workers of certain 
types, particularly those whose wages are more likely to be close to the minimum wage. 
To account for such possibility, we add interactions between the minimum wage level 
and individual characteristics of workers (age, gender, education level, and whether 
formal or informal). We report the results in columns (3) and (6) of Table 10. Given that 
minimum wages vary by occupation, in agriculture, the level effect of the minimum wage 
is absorbed by the inclusion of occupation effects. The coefficients on the interactions 
between the minimum wage and the personal characteristics indicate whether minimum 
wages affect some workers more than others. The only coefficient that is statistically 
significant is the interaction with age. The negative sign suggests that in agriculture, 
minimum wages exert a stronger upward push on wages for the adult population than for 
younger workers.  
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The level effect of the minimum wage can be recovered in urban areas because minimum 
wages vary by location within occupation. Its coefficient indicates that minimum wages 
exert an upward push on the wages of less educated workers. The results also indicate 
that minimum wages exert a higher push on the wages of women, thereby contributing to 
reduce the gender earnings gap.  
 
VI. Minimum Wages and Employment 
 
Evidence on the effect of minimum wages on employment in Kenya is scarce. To our 
knowledge, only one study studied this issue and concluded that minimum wages reduce 
employment (Omolo and Omitti, 2004). Their conclusions are based on an estimated 
negative correlation between changes in the minimum wage and changes in employment 
using aggregate data. As noted before however, a negative correlation does not establish 
causality. It could well be, for example, that the causality goes in the opposite direction, 
that is, periods of low employment growth, and in general poor output growth, lead to 
lower increases in the minimum wage.  
 
Given the problems associated with using aggregate time series data, the economic 
literature relies on repeated cross sectional or longitudinal data at the individual level to 
estimate the effect of minimum wages on employment. Unfortunately, there is not much 
labor market micro data available in Kenya. To our knowledge, in the last 10 years there 
was only one labor force survey that covered urban areas.  Nonetheless, the presence of a 
large number of minimum wages levels across occupations and locations provides 
important cross sectional variation that we can exploit with the 98/99 ILFS data to relate 
employment to the multiple minimum wages.  
 
The existing data suggest that high minimum wages in urban areas lead to a reduction in 
formal salaried employment and an increase in the share of self-employed. Figure 8 
relates the ratio of the minimum, for each occupation-location pair, to the median wage 
for all salaried workers with the share of formal salaried employment, the share of 
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informal salaried and the share of self-employment in total employment for each 
location-occupation pair. We restrict the analysis to urban areas since the wage analysis 
suggests that these are the areas where minimum wages are more likely to be binding.7 
Total employment includes salaried, self-employment, unpaid work and apprentices. The 
number of data points in these figures is constrained by: (i) the number of occupation-
location pairs for which a minimum wage is defined and (ii) the number of occupation 
location pairs for which a sufficiently large number of observations are available in the 
survey. 8   This data suggest a negative relationship between the level of the minimum 
wage –in relation to the median—and the share of formal salaried employment. It also 
suggests a strong positive association between the share of self-employment and the 
minimum to median wage ratio. Notice, for example, that the correlation coefficient 
between the share of formal salaried employment and the minimum to median wage ratio 
is -0.46 while the correlation between the share of self-employment and the minimum 
wage in the cross section of occupations-locations is equal to 0.58.  In contrast, the 
correlation with informal employment is very small and negative ( -0.09) indicating that 
minimum wages may also reduce employment for salaried informal workers. We 
formalize these results by estimating the following regression: 
 
ojojoj KS εβα ++= 1       ( )2  
 
Results are presented in tables 11 and 12. The dependent variable ojS  is the share of 
formal salaried (columns 1 and 4), informal salaried (columns 2 and 5), and self-
employed workers (columns 3 and 6) in total employment. ojK is the minimum to median 
wage ratio and ojε is the error term. The results on Table 11 are based on occupation-
location-specific minimum to median wages while the results on Table 12 are based on 
the ratio of the occupation-location specific minimum wage to median wage for all 
salaried workers.  The results on Table 11 indicate that, assuming a minimum cell size of 
                                                 
7 From the econometric point of view restricting the analysis to urban areas allow us to control for location 
and occupation fixed effects, which greatly reduces the possibility of omitted variable bias.  
8 In figure 8, we do not consider occupation-location cells for which the number of observations available 
in the survey is below 35. 
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10 observations, a 10-percentage point increase in the minimum to median wage reduces 
the share of formal salaried employment by 4.1 points, while increasing the share of self 
employment by 4.7 points. These results are statistically significant at the five percent 
level for self-employment and at the 10 percent level for salaried employment.  In 
contrast, minimum wages are found to have a marginal effect on informal salaried 
employment. The level of significance increases and the size of the coefficients becomes 
larger –but of similar magnitude-- if the threshold for the cell size is increased to 35 
observations (columns 4-6).  
 
Results become weaker if rather than measuring the level of the minimum wage with 
occupation-location-specific minimum to median wage ratios, they are instead measured 
with the ratio of each minimum wage to the median wage of all salaried workers.9 Using 
this methodologically better measure leads to much smaller estimates of the association 
between minimum wages and formal and self-employment. These estimates also suggest 
a decline in informal salaried employment as a result of higher minimum wages. Yet, 
given the number of observations, none of these coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  
 
However, increasing the threshold for cell size to at least 35 observations increases the 
size and significance of effects for formal employment and self-employment. The 
direction and size of the estimates is now in line with the ones summarized on table 11. A 
ten percent increase in the minimum to median ratio would lead to approximately 5.6 
percentage points decline in the share of formal employment and a 5.9 percentage points 
increase in the share of self-employment.  In sum, the evidence suggests that minimum 
wages in Kenya increase the share of self-employment and reduce the fraction of workers 





                                                 
9 The latter measure is better from a methodological point of view because it minimizes reverse causality. 
This arises from the fact a higher share of informal, or self employment in total employment may reduce 
the median wage, and therefore increase the minimum to median wage in a given occupation-location.  
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VII. Conclusions   
 
This paper has reviewed the main arguments in favor and against minimum wages.  
While efficiency-wage arguments may be an important part of the story, the main reason 
for instituting minimum wages is not to fight poverty or inequality: there are other 
instruments to achieve that goal. Instead, the main justification is to empower workers 
whose wages are constrained by the excessive market power of employers. The most 
important argument for not fixing minimum floors is that this instrument can price many 
workers out of formal employment. Most of the evidence for developing countries points 
to negative employment effects. 
 
The analysis developed in this paper, based on cross sectional data for 1998/99, indicates 
that minimum to median wage ratios were quite high, particularly for workers in more 
skilled occupations. At the same time, non-compliance affected one in four salaried 
workers in agriculture and one in six in urban areas. Non-compliance was higher for 
women, youth and workers with a low level of education attained. 
 
Some possible causes for the low level of enforcement of minimum wages in Kenya are 
the following. First, the many different number of categories of minimum wages makes it 
very difficult for workers and firms to know them. Second, minimum wages are set at 
levels that are too high in relation to the median wage –especially for semiskilled and 
more skilled occupations-. Finally, the classification of occupations used for the 
minimum wage is outdated implying that many occupations may no longer be adequate 
for the requirements of today’s labor market. 
 
The evidence indicates that minimum wages pushed up wages in the general order, but 
not in the agricultural industries. The indication would then be that relatively low 
minimum wages, combined with non-compliance, limited the effect of the minimum 
wage in that sector. Instead, there are signs that minimum wages in the general order 
raised wages for unskilled workers and women. However, there are also strong 
indications that such policy may have adverse effects on formal sector employment. Our 
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estimates indicate that a 10 percent points increase in the minimum to median wage ratio 
would be associated with a decline in the share of formal employment of between 1.1-5.5 
percentage points –and an increase of between 2.7-5.9 points in the share of self-
employment. 
 
This paper has provided some initial steps towards an evidence-based diagnostic of the 
effectiveness of minimum wage policies. However, such analysis is hampered by the 
scarcity of labor market data.  Up-to-date techniques to investigate the effect of minimum 
wages on poverty, inequality and employment require longitudinal micro data, or in its 
defect, a series of consecutive household level surveys taken with a quarterly, yearly or 
biannual frequency. Such data is not available in Kenya, where there are few and far 
apart household level surveys to rely upon.   Improving the frequency of data collection 
to at least once labor force survey every two years would go a long way towards 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Minimum Wage  












































Source: Own calculations based on Economic Survey (Central Bureau of Statistics), various years. 
Minimum wages correspond to the values for Nairobi and Mombassa and for general laborers. Average 
wages are for the private sector and are obtained from the Economic Survey (various years) and were 
deflated with CPI from World Development Indicators, World Bank.  Minimum Wages were deflated with 
a price index for the lower income group in Nairobi.  
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  Source: Minimum wages correspond to the values for general laborers in Nairobi and Mombassa.  







Figure 3: Minimum Wage level (relative to Median Wage for salaried population) 























Source: Authors elaboration from Labor Force data for period 1998/99. Each data point corresponds to the 
ratio of the minimum to the median wage and the non-compliance rates for one occupation-location pair 
(for example, unskilled workers in agricultural sector). For each occupation –location pair, the median 
wage is computed for overall salaried employment. 
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                   Source: Authors’ calculations based on 98/99 ILFS data.  
 
      Figure 5: Minimum Wages in Agricultural Industry-Informal Sector 1998/99 


































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS 98/99  
 
 






















































































































Minimum wage level for general laborers in 
municipalities other than Nairobi and 
Mombassa  
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Figure 8: Minimum Wage and Structure of Employment 
Share Formal in Total Employment  and Minimum to Median Wage
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Table 1: Gazetted Monthly Basic Minimum Wages for Agricultural Industry, 
1997–2004, KSh 
 
Type of Employee 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
UNSKILLED EMPLOYEES         
18 years & above 1,095 1,259 1,347 1,428 1,535 1,642 1,888 2,096 
Under 18 years 781 898 961 1,019 1,095  ..  .. .. 
STOCKMAN, HERDSMAN AND WATCHMAN         
Under 18 years 906 1,042 1,115 1,182 1,271  ..  .. .. 
18 year & above 1,263 1,453 1,555 1,648 1,772 1,896 2,180 2,420 
SKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED EMPLOYEES         
House servant or cook 1,249 1,436 1,537 1,629 1,751 1,874 2,155 2,392 
Farm foreman 1,973 2,269 2,428 2,574 2,767 2,961 3,405 3,780 
Farm clerk 1,973 2,269 2,428 2,574 2,767 2,961 3,405 3,780 
Section foreman 1,278 1,470 1,573 1,667 1,792 1,917 2,205 2,448 
Farm artisan 1,309 1,505 1,610 1,707 1,835 1,963 2,257 2,505 
Tractor driver 1,387 1,595 1,707 1,809 1,945 2,081 2,393 2,656 
Combined harvester driver 1,528 1,757 1,880 1,993 2,142 2,292 2,636 2,926 
Lorry driver or car driver 1,604 1,845 1,974 2,092 2,249 2,406 2,767 3,701 
AVERAGE 1,362 1,567 1,676 1,777 1,910 2,199 2,529 2,870 
Source: Economic Survey, Central Bureau of Statistics, from Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development 




Table 2: Gazetted Monthly Basic Mininum Wages in Urban Areas (Excluding 
Housing Allowance),  1998-2000 and 2002 - 2004, KSh 
 
Occupation 
 Nairobi Area, 
Mombasa & Kisumu  
 Other Municipalities 
plus Mavoko & Ruiru 
Town Councils  
All other towns 
 
 
  1998 1999 2000* 1998 1999 2000* 1998 1999 2000* 
General labourer 2,697 2,886 3,059 2,488 2,662 2,822 1,439 1,540 1,632 
Miner, stone cutter, turnboy, 
waiter, cook 2,912 3,116 3,303 2,593 2,764 2,930 1,663 1,779 1,886 
Night watchman  3,008 3,279 3,412 2,790 2,985 3,164 1,717 1,837 1,947 
Machine attendant 3,056 3,270 3,446 2,844 3,043 3,226 2,306 2,467 2,615 
Machinist 3,488 3,732 3,956 3,264 3,492 3,702 2,669 2,856 3,027 
Plywood machine operator 3,639 3,894 4,128 3,359 3,594 3,810 2,778 2,972 3,150 
Pattern designer 4,154 4,445 4,712 3,797 4,063 4,307 3,238 3,465 3,673 
Tailor, Driver (medium vehicle) 4,578 4,898 5,192 4,208 4,503 4,773 3,751 4,014 4,255 
Dyer, Crawler, Tractor driver, 
Salesman 5,054 5,408 5,732 4,715 5,045 5,348 4,256 4,554 4,827 
Saw doctor, Caretaker (building) 5,593 5,985 6,344 5,222 5,588 5,923 4,865 5,206 5,518 
Cashier, Driver (heavy 
commercial) 6,086 6,512 6,903 
 
5,726 6,127 6,495 5,369 5,745 6,090 
Artisan (Ungraded) 3,639 3,894 4,128 3,359 3,594 3,810 2,778 2,972 3,150 
Artisan Grade III 4,578 4,898 5,192 4,208 4,503 4,773 3,758 4,021 4,262 
Artisan Grade II 5,054 5,408 5,732 4,715 5,045 5,348 4,256 4,554 4,827 
Artisan Grade I 6,086 6,512 6,903 5,726 6,127 6,495 5,369 5,745 6,090 




 Nairobi Area, 
Mombasa & Kisumu  
 Other Municipalities 
plus Mavoko & Ruiru 
Town Councils  
All other towns 
 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
General labourer 3,518 3,905 4,335 3,246 3,603 3,999 1,877 2,083 2,312 
Miner, stone cutter, turnboy, 
waiter, cook 3,800 4,218 4,682 3,371 3,742 4,154 2,169 2,408 2,673 
Night watchman  3,925 4,357 4,836 3,639 4,039 4,483 2,240 2,486 2,759 
Machine attendant 3,987 4,426 4,913 3,711 4,119 4,572 3,008 3,339 3,706 
Machinist 4,551 5,052 5,608 4,259 4,727 5,247 3,482 3,865 4,290 
Plywood machine operator 4,749 5,271 5,851 4,383 4,865 5,400 3,623 4,022 4,464 
Pattern designer 5,420 6,016 6,678 4,954 5,499 6,104 4,224 4,689 5,205 
Tailor, Driver (medium vehicle) 5,972 6,629 7,358 5,490 6,094 6,764 4,894 5,432 6,030 
Dyer, Crawler, Tractor driver, 
Salesman 6,593 7,318 8,123 6,151 6,828 7,579 5,552 6,163 6,841 
Saw doctor, Caretaker (building) 7,297 8,100 8,991 6,813 7,562 8,394 6,347 7,045 7,820 
Cashier, Driver (heavy 
commercial) 7,940 8,813 9,782 7,471 8,293 9,205 7,005 7,776 8,631 
Artisan (Ungraded) 4,749 5,271 5,851 4,383 4,865 5,400 3,623 4,022 4,464 
Artisan Grade III 5,972 6,629 7,358 5,490 6,094 6,764 4,903 5,442 6,041 
Artisan Grade II 6,593 7,318 8,123 6,151 6,828 7,579 5,552 6,163 6,841 
Artisan Grade I 7,940 8,813 9,782 7,471 8,293 9,205 7,005 7,776 8,631 
AVERAGE 5,534 6,142 6,818 5,132 5,697 6,323 4,367 4,848 5,381 






Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
             Source: Own calculations based on ILFS 98/99 
Variables Kenya
I. Percentage of population
aged 0 to 14 years old 42.26
aged 15 to 24 years old 20.00
aged 25 to 64 years old 33.82
aged over 65 years old 3.92
women 50.08




undergraduate and postgraduate 0.92
retired 0.43
in urban areas 25.91
Nairobi and Mombasa 35.77
Other Municipalities 51.84
All other towns 6.15
sample 52 016





in urban areas 55.73
Nairobi and Mombasa 40.82
Other Municipalities 49.47




Hotels and Restaurants 5.05





III. Labor Market Indicators* 
ln 10th percentile real earnings distribution 7.36 7.87 6.73
ln 25th percentile real earnings distribution 8.01 8.23 7.22
ln 50th percentile real earnings distribution 8.52 8.69 7.79
ln 75th percentile real earnings distribution 8.97 9.03 8.29
ln 90th percentile real earnings distribution 9.35 9.44 8.78
ln average real earnings distribution 8.79 8.93 8.18
sample§ 3 331 2 409  804
# The fractions of the activities do not add up to 1 because there are some activities not reported here.
* The sample used is full time paid employees aged 18-64 years with positive earnings
§ The difference between formal and informal and total is due to missing values in status of employment. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS data 
Notes: Fraction below is the percentage of workers paid below their corresponding statutory minimum. Fraction at +/- x% is the fraction of salaried workers 
that received monthly wages within a rage of plus/minus two and five percent of the statutory minimum wage. Fraction affected is the proportion of people 























I. Agricultural Industry 510 100 0.245 0.003 0.068 0.081 0.768 0.392
unskilled 281 54.61 0.276 0.003 0.049 0.049 0.630 0.315
stockman, herdsman and watchman 159 29.57 0.265 - 0.114 0.147 0.727 0.363
house servant or cook 32 7.73 0.141 - 0.059 0.086 0.410 0.359
farm foreman, farm clerk 18 4.73 0.035 - - 0.064 0.336 0.567
farm artisan 5 0.76 0.182 0.182 0.182 - 0.753 0.376
tractor driver 8 1.22 0.207 - - - 0.659 0.399
lorry or car driver 7 1.37 - - 0.091 0.091 0.283 0.461
II. General Order 1212 100 0.176 0.021 0.029 0.051 0.529 0.767
general laborer 593 48.73 0.136 0.015 0.020 0.041 0.415 0.622
miner, stone cutter, turnboy, waiter,cook 9 0.66 0.298 - - - 0.549 0.686
machine attendant,shoe cutter 167 13.12 0.201 0.066 0.080 0.083 0.560 0.728
machinist, junior clerk 138 10.63 0.068 0.006 0.013 0.025 0.567 0.831
plywood  machine operator, copy-typist, shop assistant 172 16.02 0.074 - 0.012 0.086 0.570 0.869
pattern designer 2 0.2 1.000 - - - 1.296 0.972
dyer, crawler, tractor driver, salesman 62 6.79 0.675 0.037 0.046 0.019 1.612 1.227
saw doctor, caretaker (building) 20 1.16 0.678 0.072 0.072 0.072 1.342 1.342
cashier/driver(heavy commercial) 40 2.01 0.340 0.048 0.077 0.049 0.721 1.441
artisan (upgraded) 9 0.68 0.052 - - - 0.640 0.880
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS data.  
























A. Agricultural Industry* 510 100 0.245 0.003 0.068 0.081 0.768 0.392
unskilled male 209 39.03 0.270 0.002 0.042 0.037 0.630 0.315
female 72 15.58 0.292 0.007 0.068 0.077 0.552 0.3150.00
all other occupations male 184 35.06 0.207 0.004 0.096 0.101 0.620 0.388
female 45 10.33 0.213 0.000 0.071 0.186 0.779 0.3890.00
B.  General Order
&
1212 100 0.176 0.021 0.029 0.051 0.529 0.767
general laborer male 377 30.66 0.069 0.015 0.022 0.037 0.357 0.615
female 216 18.07 0.249 0.014 0.017 0.048 0.551 0.6340.00
all other occupations male 477 39.67 0.215 0.027 0.040 0.059 0.628 0.907
female 142 11.60 0.215 0.024 0.031 0.062 0.688 0.893
*
all other occupations in Agricultural industry refers to workers other than unskilled workers in Table 1. 
& 
all other occupations in general order refers to workers other than general labourers in Table 2.
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  Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS data.  






















A. Agricultural Industry* 510 100 0.245 0.003 0.068 0.081 0.768 0.392
unskilled Low 258 49.95 0.292 0.004 0.054 0.053 0.630 0.315
High 23 4.67 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.420 0.315
all other occupations Low 166 30.28 0.297 0.000 0.131 0.170 0.819 0.369
High 63 15.11 0.033 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.253 0.427
B.  General Order& 1212 100 0.176 0.021 0.029 0.051 0.529 0.767
general laborer Low 207 16.49 0.307 0.019 0.027 0.075 0.737 0.641
High 386 32.24 0.048 0.013 0.017 0.024 0.320 0.613
all other occupations Low 180 13.23 0.316 0.045 0.053 0.053 0.684 0.855
High 439 38.04 0.180 0.020 0.032 0.062 0.614 0.921
*
all other occupations in Agricultural industry refers to workers other than unskilled workers in Table 1. 
& 
all other occupations in general order refers to workers other than general labourers in Table 2.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS data  





















A. Agricultural Industry* 510 100 0.245 0.003 0.068 0.081 0.768 0.392
unskilled 18-25 85 15.43 0.408 0.000 0.064 0.013 0.839 0.315
26-45 145 28.73 0.203 0.003 0.053 0.065 0.594 0.315
46-64 51 10.45 0.281 0.010 0.017 0.058 0.617 0.3150.00
all other occupations 18-25 58 8.91 0.463 0.000 0.106 0.140 1.008 0.378
26-45 135 28.84 0.155 0.005 0.094 0.130 0.614 0.384
46-64 36 7.64 0.109 0.000 0.056 0.056 0.369 0.415
B.  General Order& 1212 100 0.176 0.021 0.029 0.051 0.529 0.767
general laborer 18-25 117 0.10 0.317 0.020 0.029 0.066 0.661 0.628
26-45 401 0.07 0.088 0.016 0.018 0.037 0.382 0.621
46-64 75 0.32 0.088 0.003 0.017 0.024 0.375 0.618
all other occupations 18-25 104 0.09 0.558 0.065 0.077 0.102 1.280 0.960
26-45 436 0.36 0.125 0.018 0.031 0.057 0.594 0.892
46-64 79 0.06 0.217 0.015 0.018 0.004 0.591 0.887
*
all other occupations in Agricultural industry refers to workers other than unskilled workers in Table 1. 
& 
all other occupations in general order refers to workers other than general labourers in Table 2.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILFS data  




Fraction at +/- 
2%












Area 1: Mombasa and Nairobi
general labourer 177 0.073 - 0.005 0.053 0.450 0.674
Area 2:Other Municipalities
general labourer 368 0.214 0.031 0.038 0.038 0.440 0.622
Area 3: All other towns
general labourer 48 0.008 - - - 0.189 0.360
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Table 9: Minimum Wages 
relative to the Median for all Salaried Workers 1998/9 
 


























General Laborer 0.674 0.622 0.360
general miner, stone cutter 0.728 0.646
machine attendant/shoe cutter 0.764 0.711 0.577
junior clerk/tractor driver 0.872 0.816 0.667
machine operator/copy-typist/Shop assistant 0.910 0.840 0.695
artisan (upgraded) 0.910 0.840
Salesman/tractor driver 1.264 1.179 1.064
Caretaker 1.398 1.306 1.216
Cashier/driver(heavy) 1.522 1.432 1.342
Agricultural Industry




House servant 0.359 0.718
Stockman, Herdsman and Watchman 0.363 0.727
farm artisan 0.376 0.753
Tractor driver 0.399 0.798
Lorry or car driver 0.461 0.923
farm foreman or farm clerk 0.567 1.135
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Table 10: Effect of Minimum Wages on Wages 
 
Dependent Variable: ln of Real Wages
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
ln MW    1.960*** 0.396 0.054 0.165 1.016**
[0.256] [0.213] [0.084] [0.156] [0.388]
education 0.609*** 5.369 0.600*** 5.962***
[0.118] [6.129] [0.110] [2.098]
gender (1=female) -0.120*** -0.135*** -0.183*** -0.421***
[0.028] [0.025] [0.048] [0.115]
18-25 -0.293*** 5.132** -0.359*** -2.219
[0.037] [1.431] [0.051] [1.603]
46-64 0.001 -2.281 0.240*** 2.9
[0.079] [2.332] [0.066] [1.701]










lorry or car driver 0.543*
[0.253]
miner, stone cutter, turnboy, waiter, cook -0.295 -0.328**
[0.186] [0.156]
machine attendant,shoe cutter -0.07 -0.104
[0.055] [0.063]
machinist, junior clerk -0.222*** -0.285***
[0.067] [0.065]
playwood machine operator, copy-typist, shop assistant -0.024 -0.142*
[0.062] [0.070]
pattern designer 0.018 -0.126
[0.135] [0.204]
dyer, crawler,tractor driver, salesman -0.452*** -0.651***
[0.124] [0.194]
sawdoctor, caretaker (building) -0.590*** -0.869***
[0.160] [0.157]
cashier, driver(heavy commercial) -0.02 -0.117
[0.157] [0.155]
artisan (upgraded) -0.032 -0.177*
[0.053] [0.104]
other Municipalities -0.276*** -0.264***
[0.030] [0.033]
all other towns -0.202** -0.115
[0.080] [0.092]
formal 0.597*** 1.364 0.347*** 1.367











Constant -6.644*** 4.504** 7.326*** 8.185*** 6.970*** 0.247
[1.862] [1.527] [0.030] [0.679] [1.290] [3.121]
Observations 507 493 493 1208 1162 1162
R-squared 0.1 0.44 0.46 0.00 0.35 0.37
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted categories: incomplete secondary education or less, male, 26-45 years, and Nairobi and Mombasa (General Order).
Omitted occupations: Unskilled in Agricultural Industry and General Laborer in General Order
Agricultural General Order
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on ILFS data. 
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Table 11:  Structure of Employment and Minimum to Median Wage 
Ratio for each occupation-location pair 
 
Share Salaried 

















Cell Size >10 Cell Size >10 Cell Size >10 Cell Size >35 Cell Size >35 Cell Size >35
Kaitz (minimum/median) -0.412* 0.014 0.468** -0.471 0.007 0.516**
(0.08) (0.84) (0.03) (0.05) (0.92) (0.02)
Constant   0.741***   0.121** 0.036   0.738*** 0.111** 0.054
(0.00) (0.02) (0.78) (0.00) (0.04) (0.67)
Observations 15 15 15 10 10 10
R-squared 0.218 0.003 0.316 0.391 0.001 0.493
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors from ILFS data. 
 
Table 12:  Structure of Employment and Ratio of Minimum 
 to Median Wage for the whole salaried population ratio 
 
Share Salaried 

















Cell Size >10 Cell Size >10 Cell Size >10 Cell Size >35 Cell Size >35 Cell Size >35
Kaitz (minimum/median) -0.116 -0.102 0.272   -0.559** -0.02   0.593**
(0.62) (0.12) (0.20) (0.04) (0.79) (0.02)
Constant     0.592**     0.215*** 0.088    0.929*** 0.132 -0.139
(0.01) (0.00) (0.63) (0.00) (0.08) (0.47)
Observations 15 15 15 10 10 10
R-squared 0.02 0.18 0.122 0.423 0.009 0.5
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors from ILFS data. 
  
 
